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When Do Analysts Add Value?
Evidence from Corporate Spinoffs

Abstract
We investigate the information content and forecast accuracy of 1,793 analyst reports written
around 62 spinoffs––a setting in which analysts’ ability to inform investors is potentially very
high. We find that analysts pay little attention to subsidiaries about to be spun off even though
these subsidiaries constitute a significant part of the parent company operations. Moreover, while
the level of detail in analyst research about parent companies is significantly related to EPS and
price forecast accuracy, the same is not true for the subsidiaries. We establish that this “forgotten
child” phenomenon is linked to a “neglected parent” effect, whereby inaccuracy in subsidiary
earnings forecasts is associated with inaccuracy in parent estimates. We conclude by showing
that spinoffs may be a particularly complex setting for analysts to evaluate relative to other forms
of corporate restructuring, such as IPOs, mergers, or bankruptcies, providing one potential
explanation for our findings.

The impact of financial analysts on capital market efficiency has been much debated in
academia and in practice. A large body of academic research finds that analysts act as important
information intermediaries, generating financial forecasts, stock recommendations and other
fundamental research which helps investors form more precise estimates of stock prices, thereby
contributing to the overall efficiency of capital markets (Givoly and Lakonishok, 1979; Francis
and Soffer, 1997; Hong et al., 2000; Gleason and Lee, 2003; Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Kelly and
Ljungqvist, 2008). Other research, however, has identified situations and contexts in which the
value of analyst coverage may be relatively more limited, such as when analysts face possible
conflicts of interest (Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999; Ljungqvist et al.,
2006; Agrawal and Chen, 2008; Kolasinki and Kothari, 2008), or when the company or situation
they are presented with is especially complex (Haw et al., 1994; Gilson, 2000) or not wellmatched to their area of expertise (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999; Gilson et al., 2001;
Clement et al., 2007). Still other research suggests that the informativeness of analyst
recommendations, and the depth of analyst coverage, may have been adversely affected by
certain regulatory changes. These include the adoption, in 2000, of Regulation Fair Disclosure
(FD), which limited companies’ ability to selectively disclose information to analysts and
investors (Gintschel and Markov, 2004; Agrawal et al., 2006; Gomes et al., 2007), and the 2003
Global Settlement between ten leading investment banks and Federal and State regulators, which
enforced greater separation between the banks’ research and investment banking activities
(Kadan et al., 2009).
In this paper, we examine how much value analysts create as information intermediaries
in a setting in which their ability to inform investors is potentially very high: corporate spinoffs.
When a firm spins off a subsidiary or division, each current outstanding share is in effect
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converted into two new shares, representing separate claims on the stand-alone operations of the
parent and newly-independent subsidiary. Prior to the effective date of the spinoff, therefore,
actual or potential investors in the parent firm stock will benefit from any useful information that
analysts can provide them about how the spinoff will impact value and the future financial
performance of both the parent and the subsidiary.
The potential for analysts to add value in this situation is especially high because while
the new entities created by the spinoff have no stock price history—similar to an IPO—analysts
may have been following the businesses of the parent and subsidiary for an extended time, giving
them a comparative advantage in forecasting both entities’ future financial performance. 1
Analysts’ knowledge about the company and their industry expertise should also give them a
comparative advantage in forecasting how shared corporate assets, liabilities, and overhead
expense will be allocated between the parent and subsidiary as part of the separation of the two
entities (analogous to dividing up common property in a divorce).
Humana Inc.’s spinoff of Galen Health Care provides a case in point. As the nation’s
largest health care provider, the company was diversified into two distinct businesses: health
plan management, and hospital ownership and operation. In the early 1990’s, Humana’s
management began to question the wisdom of this integrated strategy and eventually announced
that it would be spinning off its hospital business under the Galen name. In structuring the
transaction, one critical issue that emerged was how to allocate debt and corporate overhead
between the two entities. An unsophisticated investor might have followed a simple rule of
allocating these shared resources in proportion to each business’ contribution to the integrated
company’s total assets, sales or profits. In fact, such rules are even used by sophisticated
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In our sample, the time elapsed between the initial spinoff announcement and the effective date of the spinoff is as
long as two years.
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academic researchers in large sample empirical studies––e.g. Berger and Ofek (1995) and
subsequent studies of the conglomerate discount––where a more detailed analysis of each
company is impractical. In contrast, a better informed and more dedicated financial analyst
hypothetically following Humana might realize that such a rule would have resulted in a
nonsensical allocation of corporate overhead in this case, since the less asset-intensive
business—health plans––was the one that made greater use of the company’s shared computer
and data processing systems (Gilson, 1994).
Various factors may offset the apparent advantages that analysts have in assessing the
impact of a spinoff, however. Prior to the spinoff, the firm may have reported relatively limited
segment data, or have been lax in allocating overhead to individual business segments. When the
parent and subsidiary conduct business with one another, identifying the stand-alone profitability
of each can be confounded by transfer pricing issues. Analysts typically specialize in following
certain industries, so they may produce less accurate forecasts when the parent and subsidiary
operate in different industries (Zuckerman, 1999; Gilson et al., 2001). 2 The spinoff may be
motivated by changes in the firm’s industry or markets, which by themselves make it more
difficult to forecast future financial performance. And, in the wake of Regulation FD and the
Global Settlement, analysts may lack access to valuable information about the spinoff that they
might previously have obtained from management or their firm’s investment banking division.
Whether analysts are able to provide investors with useful information in a situation where such
information is particularly valuable is, therefore, an empirical question.

2

Zuckerman (1999) shows that conglomerates are discounted to the extent that they are not covered by the analysts
who specialize in their industries. Gilson et al. (2001) further show that, when those conglomerates are broken up
through spinoffs, equity carve-outs, or tracking stock offerings, there are significant forecast improvements resulting
from the increased coverage (of the “pieces”) by industry-specialized analysts.
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This paper provides empirical evidence on the quantity and quality of analysts’ research
for a large sample of pending equity spinoffs and tracking stock offerings. Our sample includes
62 firms that announced a spinoff or the creation of a tracking stock between 1985 and 2000. We
focus on transactions that were announced before October 2000, thereby excluding the impact of
Regulation FD and the Global Settlement, so that we can conduct a more powerful test of
analysts’ ability to produce valuable information for investors. This type of analyst research and
its outcome (separate price and earnings forecasts for parent and subsidiary) can only be
observed in the actual analyst reports, not in any electronic database like I/B/E/S or Zacks.
Therefore, we manually collected information from 1,793 analyst reports issued for our sample
firms.
An important contribution of this paper is that it is one of the first to provide very finegrained detail on the quantity and types of analyses included in analyst reports, a feature it shares
with only three other papers: Gilson’s (2000) clinical study of the United Airlines employee
buyout, and the large-sample studies of Asquith et al. (2005) and Houston et al. (2006). The most
striking result that emerges from our descriptive analysis is what we refer to as the “forgotten
child” effect. Namely, in their reports about companies that have announced a spinoff, analysts
provide less information about subsidiaries that are to be spun off and make much less accurate
earnings forecasts for them than they do for the parent companies, even though these subsidiaries
represent a significant fraction of the combined entities’ assets and sales (about 45% and 20%,
respectively). The relative lack of attention given to subsidiaries in analysts’ published research
is remarkable, since any forecast of the parent’s future performance must account for the loss of
the subsidiary’s business, so analysts must necessarily analyze the financial performance of both
the parent and the subsidiary.
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To better understand what is driving the results of our descriptive analysis, we use singleand two-stage regression models to examine the relation between the information content of
analyst reports and the accuracy of their earnings and price forecasts about both the parent and
subsidiary companies. We find that the accuracy of parent EPS forecasts is quite significantly
related to a number of variables representing the information reported by analysts, including the
number of annual earnings forecasts and the number of financial statements provided about the
parent company. These EPS forecasts are also associated with several other relevant factors, such
as the industrial relatedness of the parent and subsidiary firms, and the industry expertise of the
analyst or the brokerage firm. In contrast to the parent company results, very few factors seem to
influence the accuracy of subsidiary EPS forecasts, even after controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity and for possible selection bias. Moreover, there are few factors associated with
price forecast accuracy, particularly for subsidiaries, perhaps reflecting the fact that is very
difficult for anyone, analysts included, to make accurate stock price forecasts.
In light of these findings, we then consider whether analysts’ tendency to “forget the
child,” the spun-off subsidiary, in turn leads them to “neglect the parent” by making less accurate
forecasts about it. We investigate this question by considering the extent to which subsidiary
forecast errors are associated with parent forecast errors. We find that when analysts make lessaccurate earnings forecasts about the subsidiary, they also make less accurate forecasts about the
parent company, providing support for the “forgotten child, neglected parent” hypothesis.
One potential explanation for our results is that the task of forecasting earnings and stock
prices at the time of an impending spinoff may be particularly complex, perhaps even more so
than it is in other “special situations” such as IPOs, mergers, bankruptcies, and other forms of

5

corporate restructuring. A comparison of the accuracy of analysts’ price and earnings forecasts to
those reported in studies of other such special situations provides support for this explanation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data and
sample for our study. Section 2 presents the results of our descriptive analysis of the quantity and
type of information provided by analysts in anticipation of corporate spinoffs. Sections 3 and 4
analyze the quality of that information to the extent that it influences the accuracy of earnings
and price forecasts, respectively. Section 5 compares the accuracy of analyst forecasts in our
sample of spinoffs with what other studies have reported for other types of complex transactions.
Section 6 concludes.
1. Data and Sample
Our sample consists of 1,793 analyst reports covering the parent company and/or the
subsidiary from a random sample of 62 refocusing transactions (58 spinoffs and 4 tracking stock
issues) which were announced between 1985 and 2000. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to
all of these transactions as “spinoffs” indistinctively.
The dataset was constructed as follows. First, an initial sample of spinoffs (and tracking
stock issues) was retrieved from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Mergers and
Acquisitions database. Specifically, a search for all divestitures of U.S. targets (i.e., subsidiaries)
to the parent company shareholders announced after January 1, 1985 and effective before
December 31, 2001 yielded 943 transactions. From these, we eliminated 351 transactions that
were announced but never completed; 144 transactions in which the subsidiary’s stock was
already trading in the market separately before the spinoff because of an earlier equity carve out
(e.g. Agilent from Hewlett-Packard, or Lucent from AT&T); and 98 duplicate observations

6

(deals that were listed more than once in SDC). These eliminations resulted in a sample of 350
spinoffs.
Second, we used Compustat to obtain financial data for the parent and subsidiary
companies in the effective years of each of these 350 spinoffs. Data on sales, assets, and market
value for both the parent and subsidiary companies were available for 267 of these spinoffs. 3
This number, as well as the other numbers of observations or transactions reported so far, refers
to the number of new companies that were spun off. Because some transactions involve the
simultaneous spinoff of more than one subsidiary by the parent (e.g. Dun & Bradstreet’s double
divestiture of A.C. Nielsen and Cognizant), the actual number of deals is lower (254). 4, 5
Out of the 254 deals, we randomly selected 66 as our final sample for analysis, in which
four deals were double divestitures and one deal was a triple divestiture. For each of these 66
deals, we retrieved from Investext all analyst reports that were issued about the parent, the
subsidiary, or both, during the time period ranging from one month prior to the announcement
date to one month after the effective date. When a deal was a multiple divestiture, we selected all
reports issued about the parent or any of the subsidiaries during the time period ranging from one
month prior to the earliest announcement date to one month after the latest effective date. This
process yielded a sample of 2,512 reports.

3

In addition to SDC and Compustat CUSIPs and company names, we used information from the Center for
Research on Security Prices (CRSP)-Compustat Header File, the CCH Capital Changes Reporter, and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) website (which lists all former names for any given company), to maximize the
number of merged SDC-Compustat observations. Whenever data were not available for the exact year of the
spinoff’s effective date, we used data from the latest year in which the parent company’s old stock was listed in
Compustat, and/or from the first year in which the spun-off company started being included in Compustat (as far as
two years before or after the spinoff became effective).
4
We define two or more spinoffs by the same parent as a multiple divestiture when either the announcement or the
effective date was within less than a week of each other. Choosing a different threshold, e.g. a month, or five days,
instead of a week, does not make a difference.
5
The 267-spinoff sample included 14 such multiple divestitures––nine double divestitures and two triple
divestitures for which all spun-off companies are included in the sample, plus three additional double divestitures for
which one of the spun-off companies had already been eliminated at the prior stage because of an earlier carve-out.
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Of these 2,512 analyst reports, we subsequently eliminated those that were issued prior to
the spinoff announcement date, when analysts may not have been aware that it was coming, or
after the effective date, when the spun-off entity began trading as an independent company (and
analysts therefore had actual stock prices to guide their analysis, which our research design seeks
to avoid). Within the remaining 1,932 reports, 139 more were identified as duplicate reports and
removed, leaving a final sample of 1,793 reports, or an average of 28.9 reports per spinoff. These
eliminations resulted in the removal of four more deals from the sample, as all the reports on the
parties to these transactions were written either before the announcement date or after the
effective date. Thus, the 1,793 reports analyzed in this paper cover 62 transactions in total,
representing 52 parent companies due to multiple spinoff transactions. 6 Two of the parent
companies, Premark International and Promus Cos., were themselves spun off from other
companies earlier in our sample period. 7 Table 1 lists the spinoffs included in the sample, their
announcement and effective dates, and the number of analyst reports pertaining to each spinoff.
Table 2 presents summary statistics on the financial characteristics of the 52 parent
companies analyzed in this paper, alongside data on the 62 subsidiaries which these firms spun
off. All statistics in this table are measured as of the end of the fiscal year in which each spinoff
became effective. Not surprisingly, the parent companies are significantly larger than the
subsidiaries they spun off in terms of sales, total assets, and market value. However, the
subsidiaries are not particularly small: their mean (median) sales are $2.2 billion ($1.2 billion)––
about one fifth (one third) of the parent company sales. Parent companies do not appear to have

6

All of the results that follow in this paper are identical if we eliminate the multiple-spinoff transactions and/or the
tracking stock issues from our sample.
7
In 1986, Kraft spun off Premark International, which ten years later spun off Tupperware. In 1990, Holiday Corp.
spun off Promus Cos., which in turn spun off Promus Hotels Corp. in 1995.
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significantly higher leverage, profit margins, or capital expenditures than the spun-off
subsidiaries.
The third and most distinctive step in our data collection process consisted of reading the
1,793 analyst reports in their entirety (10,160 pages altogether) and manually coding their
content. Specifically, we gathered data about both parents and subsidiaries on the types of
financial analyses conducted and valuation methods employed, the earnings and price forecasts
made, the amount of detailed analysis performed about each spinoff, and analyst sentiment about
the parent company’s stock and about the spinoff itself. Given the magnitude of this task, we
hired and trained a team of advanced undergraduate students with financial knowledge or
experience to gather these data. Several steps were taken to ensure the reliability of the data they
collected. First, to verify the quality of their work, the reports pertaining to several spinoffs were
assigned to more than one student (unbeknownst to them), so that each student’s work was crosschecked by at least one other student. When discrepancies were found, we personally checked
the original analyst reports to ascertain which student was mistaken and instructed him or her to
correct the mistakes in that and any other reports he or she had coded. Second, to ensure
consistency across students in the way the more subjective information was coded, we had a
different student go over the coding of the qualitative items across all reports. 8 Third, we had
three other students, including a graduate student, go over the entire data set and recode some of
the quantitative items whenever serious errors, omissions, or inconsistencies became apparent.
As a final step in our data collection process, we collected data about the analysts in our
sample and the investment banks or research firms they were working for at the time they issued
each report. The sources of these data included Thomson’s I/B/E/S; Institutional Investor
8

As a further check on the validity of this data, we ran t-tests comparing the mean values of the variables coded by
each pair of students, and these differences were rarely statistically significant, suggesting that inter-rater reliability
was high.
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magazine; the IPO underwriter reputation rankings developed by Carter and Manaster (1990),
Carter et al. (1998), and Loughran and Ritter (2004), which are available from Jay Ritter’s
website; 9 Ljungqvist et al.’s (2006) graphical timeline of major investment bank mergers
between 1988 and 2002; and an updated version of their chart which was published in the New
York Times on September 28, 2008.
2. Information Content of Analyst Reports about Upcoming Spinoffs
Table 3 presents summary data on the different types of analyses conducted,
methodologies employed, and sentiments expressed by the analysts who wrote the reports in our
sample. These summary statistics are disaggregated according to whether an analyst provided the
relevant information about the parent company, its subsidiary, or the transaction itself.
The information provided by analysts about subsidiaries is typically much sparser than
the information provided about the parents, suggesting that these subsidiaries are the “forgotten
child” in analysts’ research. For example, the average report in our sample is 5.7 pages long, of
which 3.3 pages are devoted to analyzing the parent company and less than one (0.9 pages) to
analyzing its subsidiary. 10 Consistent with this pattern, over 80% of all reports include an
earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast for the parent, whereas over 80% of all reports include no EPS
forecast for the subsidiary. Similarly, nearly half of the reports provide an EPS growth forecast
and over three quarters provide a forecast of the price-to-earnings (PE) ratio for the parent,
compared to about three percent of reports providing an EPS growth forecast and eight percent
providing a PE forecast for the subsidiary. Finally, analysts appear to be much more likely to
make other profit forecasts (such as EBITDA or net income) and financial statement for the
parents than they are for the subsidiaries. In contrast to these patterns, however, analysts are
9

http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/rank.pdf
The remaining pages typically contain information about other subsidiaries in the parent company, as well as nonsubstantive information such as legal disclaimers.
10
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approximately equally likely to forecast stock prices and market capitalizations for the parents 11
as they are for the subsidiaries, and in terms of valuation methods, analysts are most likely to use
a PE multiple of comparable companies to value subsidiaries, just as they do for the parents.
In addition to parent- and subsidiary-specific information, reports sometimes included
analyses of and sentiments expressed about the upcoming spinoff transactions. We specifically
gathered data on whether each report included a discussion of six characteristics pertaining to the
spinoffs: 32.9% of reports provided an analysis of the firms’ competitors; 35.4% included
financial information on the parent firm’s business segments; 26.4% discussed the rationale for
the spinoff; 13.2% mentioned the notion of a conglomerate discount; 13.8% ventured forecasts
of how debt or overhead costs would be allocated in the spinoff process; and 8.4% discussed the
spinoff’s transaction costs.
Many prior studies have documented the near-absence of “sell” recommendations in
analyst reports (e.g., Lin and McNichols, 1998; Barber et al., 2001; Morgan and Stocken 2003;
Cowen et al., 2006; or Houston et al., 2006). Consistent with their findings, most of the reports in
our sample expressed a favorable, or at worst, neutral opinion about the parent’s stock (62% and
25%, respectively); not even 1% of reports made negative recommendations. This result is
perhaps not surprising, if managers undertake spinoffs because they expect them to create value
(Schipper and Smith, 1983; Hite and Owers, 1983; D’Souza and Jacob, 2000). More unique to
this paper is the finding of a slightly higher dispersion in analyst sentiment about the spinoff
transactions themselves: just over a third of reports expressed a positive opinion about the
transactions and nearly half were neutral about them, though once again, only 1% of reports
expressed a negative opinion about the spinoffs.
11

Specifically, 32.7% of reports provide either a stock price forecast and/or a market capitalization forecast. Of
these, 28.6% provide only a stock price forecast, 0.8% provide only a market capitalization forecast (from which it
is possible to derive a price forecast), and 3.3% provide both types of forecast.
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Our findings about the information content of analyst reports are overall consistent with
those reported by Asquith et al. (2005) and Houston et al. (2006). Both studies found, as does
ours, that PE multiples are the most commonly used valuation method, followed by enterprise
value multiples of sales and EBITDA, and lastly by DCF. Asquith et al. also report, as do we,
that income statements are the financial statements most commonly forecasted by analysts.
However, there are some differences between our findings in terms of the frequency with which
similar items are reported, as can be reasonably expected from the differences in our sample
selection processes. For instance, Houston et al. find price targets in 79% of reports for their
sample of IPO firms during the hot market period of 1996–2000. Almost all reports in Asquith et
al.’s sample contain earnings forecasts and about three-quarters contain price targets (as
compared to the respective figures of 80% and 33%, in our sample). 12 Yet, only 10% of Asquith
et al.’s sample reports contain segment financial information, as compared to 35.4% in our
sample. This higher frequency can be expected since our sample companies are, by definition,
conglomerates about to spin off one or more of their businesses.
What is more remarkable is how little attention analysts pay in their reports to the
subsidiaries to be spun off, despite the fact that these subsidiaries are reasonably-sized entities in
and of themselves. Even if analysts were not interested in covering the subsidiaries once they
began trading as independent companies because of their size, industry, or some other reason, the
fact that these analysts are covering the parent companies would lead one to expect greater
analysis of the subsidiaries, in that their spinoffs are bound to change the parent companies’
12

Asquith et al. (2005) selected a sample of reports written by Institutional Investor’s All-American Research Team,
which have been found to be the best in their industry both by the institutional investors who rated them and by the
academic researchers who have analyzed the accuracy of their forecasts e.g., Stickel (1992). This sample selection
criterion is also likely to lead to the inclusion of relatively large companies in the sample––an additional reason why
we expect to find less information in our sample reports. Indeed, Asquith et al. report an average market value of
equity of $16 billion for their sample firms; the comparable figure for our sample (as can be inferred from Table 2)
is $12 billion.
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futures significantly. Our finding that this is not the case therefore implies that, by forgetting
about the “child”, analysts are somehow neglecting the parent as well.
3. Accuracy of Analysts’ Earnings and Price Forecasts around Spinoffs
We proceed to examine how accurate analysts are at forecasting the earnings and stock
prices of both parent and subsidiary companies in anticipation of spinoffs. Two earlier studies
have looked at analysts’ forecasting abilities around these types of deals: Krishnaswami and
Subramaniam (1999) and Gilson et al. (2001). Our detailed database of actual analyst reports
allows us to extend their analysis in two ways: by looking at analyst forecasts for the subsidiary
as well as for the parent, and by looking at price forecasts in addition to earnings forecasts.
3.1. Earnings Forecast Accuracy
Following these and most other studies of analyst earnings forecast accuracy (e.g.
Thomas, 2002; Agrawal et al., 2006), we measure EPS Forecast Error as the absolute value of
the difference between the EPS forecasted for the subsequent year and actual EPS on the forecast
date, scaled by the company’s stock price. Like Gilson et al. (2001) and Agrawal et al. (2006),
we measure the parent company’s stock price at the end of the fiscal year prior to the forecast
period for our Parent EPS Forecast Error variable. For the Subsidiary EPS Forecast Error
variable, since there is no stock price available in the year prior to the forecast, we measure the
subsidiary stock price at the end of the first fiscal year in which the stock trades. We further
follow Agrawal et al. (2006) in eliminating outliers in which the relevant stock price used to
construct this variable is less than $1, and those for which EPS Forecast Error is greater than or
equal to two. Higher values of EPS Forecast Error thus indicate that a forecast is less accurate
(as the difference between the actual and forecasted values is greater), and vice versa.
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The first row in Panel A of Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for EPS Forecast Error.
The mean (median) EPS Forecast Error for parent companies is 5.6% (1.3%). These numbers are
in line with those found by prior researchers studying spinoffs, especially Krishnaswami and
Subramaniam (1999), who report pre-spinoff mean (median) earnings forecast errors of 4.3%
(1.1%). Gilson et al. (2001) report mean errors of 2.82% for the last fiscal year before the
spinoffs in their sample. 13 By contrast, analysts tend to produce less accurate forecasts of postspinoff EPS for subsidiaries: the mean (median) EPS Forecast Error for subsidiaries is 7.5%
(3.3%). No other study has analyzed forecast errors for subsidiaries in spinoffs. 14 These
univariate differences in mean (median) EPS Forecast Errors between the parent companies and
their subsidiaries are statistically significant: the t-statistic (z-statistic) is 1.73 (3.24).
3.2. Price Forecast Accuracy
For symmetry with our analysis of earnings forecast accuracy, our primary measure of
Price Forecast Error is constructed as the absolute value of the forecasted (target) stock price
less the actual stock price on the forecast date, scaled by the company’s stock price on the
forecast date. As with EPS Forecast Error, higher values of Price Forecast Error indicate that
analysts were less accurate in their price forecasts, and vice versa. As before, we construct this
variable for all price forecasts made about parent companies (Parent Price Forecast Error) and
their spun-off subsidiaries (Subsidiary Price Forecast Error).
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By construction, the forecasts in our sample were all issued before the spinoff, even though the date for which the
analysts were forecasting may have been after the spinoff became effective.
14
However, our findings are consistent with Thomas (2002), who reports mean forecast errors of 3.7% for
conglomerate firms and larger errors for a matched control group of single-segment firms. Although this result
seems hard to reconcile with Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) and Gilson et al.’s (2001) finding that
earnings forecast accuracy improves significantly after conglomerate stock breakups, the explanation offered by
Thomas is that even if analysts’ forecast errors are larger for conglomerates than they are for focused firms, so long
as those errors are imperfectly correlated, the consolidated forecast may in fact be more accurate than the forecast
for a focused firm. This “information diversification” hypothesis may also be at play in our context.
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The first row in Panel B of Table 4 shows that the mean (median) Parent Price Forecast
Error is 44% (21%) and the mean (median) Subsidiary Price Forecast Error is 48% (26%), each
many times larger than the EPS forecast errors reported in Panel A. Predictably, the difference in
the mean Parent Price Forecast Error is not statistically different from the mean Subsidiary
Price Forecast Error (the t-statistic is -0.82), and the difference in medians is not statistically
significantly different from zero either (the z-statistic is -0.44).
In sum, the significant differences between the accuracy of the earnings forecasts analysts
make for the parent and subsidiary companies is consistent with the notion, suggested by our
earlier findings in the paper, that spun-off subsidiaries are the “forgotten child” of analyst
research. The lack of significant differences between parent and subsidiary price forecast errors
is not surprising, however, given that stock prices are inherently more difficult to forecast than
accounting performance.
4. Impact of the Information Content of Analyst Reports on Forecast Accuracy
In this section of the paper, we extend our analyses from the previous two sections by
examining the relationship between the amount and type of research performed by analysts about
upcoming spinoffs and their performance in forecasting earnings and stock prices.
4.1. Variable Descriptions
The dependent variables in these regressions are EPS Forecast Error and Price Forecast
Error, for the parent and subsidiary companies. The independent variables we include can be
broken down into five categories, discussed below, and summary statistics appear in Table 5.
The first set of variables measures the amount of attention analysts devote to companies
in their reports. Total Report Pages is the total number of pages included in the report and Share
of Report Pages is the proportion of pages in the report devoted to analyzing either the parent or
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subsidiary. Price Forecast is an indicator variable which takes the value one if an analyst
forecasts a company’s stock price. Number of Annual EPS Forecasts is a count of the number of
years for which an analyst forecasts annual earnings-per-share for a company, and EPS Growth
Forecast is an indicator variable taking the value one if an analyst forecasts growth in a
company’s EPS. Similarly, PE Forecast is an indicator variable which takes the value one if an
analyst forecasts a company’s P/E ratio, and Other Forecast is an indicator variable taking the
value one if an analyst forecasts another accounting item or valuation ratio, e.g., revenues.
Finally, Financial Statement Index is a count of the number of pro-forma financial statements––
balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement––included in the report. We predict
that these variables will all be negatively associated with EPS Forecast Error, as analysts should
make more accurate forecasts the more detail they include about a company in their reports.
The second category contains two variables representing the analysis performed about the
spinoff transaction itself. Spinoff Analysis Index is a count of how many of the following six
analyses analysts include in their reports: competitor analysis, segment-level financial
information, rationale for the spinoff, analysis of the conglomerate discount, allocation of debt or
overhead costs, and transaction costs associated with the spinoff. Days from Announcement to
Report Date is defined as the number of days that have elapsed from the announcement of a
spinoff to the date on which a report was written. Both of these variables should be negatively
associated with EPS Forecast Error, as analysts can be expected to make more accurate
forecasts when they devote more effort to analyzing an upcoming transaction.
The third category contains three control variables representing company-specific
characteristics: Ln(Total Assets); Total Assets of Subsidiary / Total Assets of Parent; and
Relatedness, an indicator variable taking the value one if the parent company and its spun-off

16

subsidiary share a four-digit SIC code. We expect the first two of these variables to be positively
associated with EPS Forecast Error, since analysts are likely to make less accurate earnings
forecasts about large firms and about companies undertaking complex transactions. However,
Relatedness can be expected to be negatively correlated with forecast accuracy, as analysts are
likely to make more accurate forecasts when they are evaluating related businesses.
The fourth category represents the characteristics of the analysts and brokerage firms
issuing the reports in our sample. Analyst Ranking by Institutional Investor (II) is a categorical
variable taking the value one if an analyst is a runner-up, two if the analyst is ranked third, three
if the analyst is ranked second, and four if the analyst is ranked first by Institutional Investor.15
Similarly, Broker Reputation Ranking is the underwriter reputation ranking developed by and
analyzed in Carter and Manaster (1990), Carter et al. (1998), and Loughran and Ritter (2004). If
these variables measure analyst and brokerage expertise, then they should be negatively
associated with EPS Forecast Error; however, if they reflect something other than expertise,
such as overconfidence, these variables could be positively associated with EPS Forecast Error.
To help resolve this ambiguity, we include two other variables measuring the experience
analysts and brokerages have accumulated in analyzing particular industrial sectors. Analyst
Provides 10%+ of Broker’s Reports in Sector is an indicator variable which takes the value one
if an analyst writes 10% or more of the reports issued by his brokerage firm about firms
operating in a given industrial sector. 16 Analogously, Broker Provides 2%+ of Reports in Sector
is an indicator variable taking the value one if a brokerage firm issues 2% or more of the reports
15

Analyst Ranking by II is derived from Institutional Investor Magazine, which ranks the top three analysts in
several sectors, along with the runners-up, reflecting analysts’ reputations in the investment community (Leone and
Wu, 2007; Groysberg et al., 2008).
16
I/B/E/S uses its own classification scheme, generally based on the Morgan Stanley Capital International Industry
Classifications, to define the industrial sectors in which companies operate. In this system, the sector in which a firm
operates is the broadest industrial definition, followed by the industry, and then the group. For example, Anheuser
Busch operates in the Consumer Non-Durables sector, the Beverage industry, and the Breweries group, while Hilton
Hotels operates in the Consumer Service sector, the Leisure industry, and the Hotels group.
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in any given industrial sector. 17 In contrast to the ranking variables, these two variables reflect
industrial expertise, so we expect them to be negatively correlated with EPS Forecast Error.
We also include Analyst Advisor, a count of the number of deals in the ten years
preceding a spinoff in which the investment bank issuing the analyst report (or a predecessor
bank that merged into it) participated as an advisor of some sort. 18 This variable is included to
control for the effects on forecast accuracy of brokerage firms having a prior advisory
relationship with companies. If such relationships represent accumulated expertise, then Analyst
Advisor should be associated with improved forecast accuracy. However, if these relationships
signify conflicts of interest, then Analyst Advisor should be linked to less accurate forecasts.
Finally, the fifth category measures analyst sentiment about the upcoming spinoff.
Optimistic Spinoff Spin is an indicator variable taking the value one if an analyst expressed a
favorable opinion about a spinoff, suggesting that it should be negatively associated with EPS
Forecast Error. Pessimistic Spinoff Spin is an indicator variable which takes the value one if an
analyst expressed an unfavorable opinion about a spinoff, suggesting that it should be positively
related to EPS Forecast Error. 19
4.2. Analyst Research and Earnings Forecast Accuracy
Table 6 presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions in which the dependent
variables are Parent EPS Forecast Error in Regression [1] and Subsidiary EPS Forecast Error
in Regression [2]. The independent variables described in the previous subsections, as well as
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The thresholds of 10% and 2% were chosen, respectively, to calculate Analyst Provides 10%+ of Broker’s
Reports in Sector and Broker Provides 2%+ of Reports in Sector because they were the median values in the
distributions of these two variables. Our results are not sensitive to either of these two cutoffs.
18
“Deals” include mergers and acquisitions, spinoffs, divestitures, and equity issues (both IPOs and SEOs). Data for
this variable were gathered from Thomson One and Capital IQ.
19
Both of these variables take the value zero if an analyst expressed a neutral or no opinion about a spinoff.
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year fixed effects, are included in these models. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
analyst level to account for intra-group correlation among reports written by the same analyst.
In Regression [1], the relations between Parent EPS Forecast Error and the independent
variables are generally as predicted. The coefficients on Fraction Parent Pages, Number of
Annual Parent EPS Forecasts, and Other Parent Forecast are all negative and significant,
suggesting that when analysts devote more attention to parent companies, they make more
accurate forecasts about them. The coefficient on Parent Financial Statement Index is positive
and significant, suggesting that the more financial statements analysts project, the less accurate
their forecasts. 20 Days from Announcement to Report Date is negative and statistically
significant, indicating that analysts make more accurate forecasts the greater the amount of time
elapsed between the announcement and report dates. Ln(Total Assets of Parent) and Total Assets
of Subsidiary / Total Assets of Parent are positive and statistically significant, meaning that
analysts make less accurate forecasts about larger firms and firms involved in more complex
transactions. By contrast, the coefficient on Relatedness is negative and statistically significant,
suggesting that analysts make more accurate forecasts about a parent company when it is related
to the segment it is about to spin off.
The coefficients on the two “ranking” variables, Analyst Ranking by II and Broker
Reputation Ranking, are both positive and significant. Consistent with the earlier discussion, the
signs of these coefficients suggest that these ranking schemes may reflect something other than
analyst or brokerage firm expertise. By contrast, the coefficients on Analyst Provides 10%+ of
Broker’s Reports in Sector and Broker Provides 2%+ of Reports in Sector are both negative and
20

While this result may seem counterintuitive at first, it is likely to be attributable to some omitted variable that is
positively associated both with forecast errors and with analysts’ propensity to forecast financial statements, such as
the noisiness of the environment. Consistent with this explanation, DeFond et al. (2003) find that analysts are more
likely to forecast cash flows for firms that have high earnings volatility.
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statistically significant, meaning that industry experience is indeed linked to improved forecast
accuracy. Additionally, the coefficient on Analyst Advisor is negative and significant, indicating
that prior advisory relationships are also correlated with improved forecast accuracy. Finally, the
coefficient on Optimistic Spinoff Spin is negative and significant, suggesting that analysts make
more accurate forecasts about a company when they have expressed a favorable opinion about its
spinoff. The coefficient on Pessimistic Spinoff Spin is positive, though it is not statistically
significant. 21
Regression [2], in which the dependent variable is Subsidiary EPS Forecast Error, tells a
dramatically different story. The only significant variable representing the contents of the analyst
report is Subsidiary Price Forecast, whose coefficient is negative and significant, suggesting that
analysts make more accurate earnings forecasts for subsidiaries when they include a price
forecast in their analyses. Additionally, the coefficient on Days from Announcement to Report
Date is negative and significant, again indicating that analysts make more accurate forecasts
when more time elapses after the announcement date. The coefficient on Ln(Total Assets of
Subsidiary) is again positive and significant, suggesting that analysts make less accurate earnings
forecasts for larger subsidiaries. The coefficient on Broker Provides 2%+ Reports in Sector is
positive and significant, suggesting that the industrial expertise of a brokerage is related to less
accurate forecasts, potentially because this industry expertise is specialized to the parent, not the
subsidiary. Finally, the coefficient on Analyst Advisor is negative and significant, indicating that
previous advisory relationships are again correlated with more accurate earnings forecasts.
It is important to highlight two major differences between these subsidiary-level results
and the parent company results. First, many fewer variables are significant in the subsidiary
21

We find similar results when we replace these two “spinoff spin” variables with analogous variables for analysts’
stock recommendations: positive recommendations are associated with more accurate forecasts, and negative
recommendations with less accurate forecasts.
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regression than were in the parent company regression. Second, and more strikingly, the
significant variables in the subsidiary regression pertain to analyst and company characteristics,
not to the contents of the reports. In the parent company regression, however, both types of
variables are related to forecast accuracy. These two differences are consistent with our earlier
depiction of subsidiaries as the “forgotten children” of companies covered in analyst reports.
4.3. Controlling for Unobserved Heterogeneity and Selection Bias
One potential concern with the foregoing results is that they do not fully account for the
possibility that the observations are not truly independent of one another. While the standard
errors in the regressions in the previous subsection are clustered at the analyst level, an additional
way of accounting for this concern is to include analyst fixed effects and thus correct the
estimates for unobserved heterogeneity. 22 Table 7 presents the fixed effects regression results.
As before, Regression [1] in Table 7 takes Parent EPS Forecast Error as its dependent
variable, while Regression [2] uses Subsidiary EPS Forecast Error. The number of significant
coefficients falls in both regressions, suggesting that analyst fixed effects explain a portion of the
variation. Nevertheless, many of the same variables in Regression [1], the parent firm regression,
remain statistically significant. By contrast, none of the coefficients in Regression [2] is
statistically significant, lending further support to our finding that subsidiaries appear to be the
forgotten children of analyst reports.
A second potential concern with the results presented in the preceding subsection is that
they may be driven by the effects of selection: of the 1,793 reports comprising our sample, 1,400
of them include EPS forecasts for the parent companies and only 263 of them provide such
forecasts for the subsidiaries. As a result, the factors driving analysts to include EPS forecasts in
22

It would not be appropriate to include firm or deal fixed effects because they would entirely swamp the variation
across analysts––the key unit of analysis in this work––as we are primarily interested in what analysts include in
their models and how these items influence analysts’ forecast accuracy.
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their reports may be correlated in unobserved ways with their ability, or lack thereof, to make
accurate forecasts. Thus, it becomes desirable to rule out this possibility by using Heckman twostage models instead of ordinary least squares regressions.
Heckman’s estimator requires an exclusion restriction, i.e., at least one (instrumental)
variable that is correlated with analysts’ propensities to include EPS forecasts in their reports but
not with the accuracy of those forecasts, and which should thus be included in the first-stage
specification but rightfully excluded from the second. We propose and use as our instrument
Subsidiary IPO / Parent IPO, the ratio of the dollar value of IPO issues in the subsidiary’s
industry to the dollar value of IPO issues in the parent’s industry, both measured in the year in
which each analyst report was written.
The logic behind this instrument is as follows. We expect Subsidiary IPO / Parent IPO to
be correlated with EPS Forecast, in that analysts should be more likely to include greater detail
in their coverage of companies operating in “hot” industries (O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Rajan
and Servaes, 1997) More specifically, we predict a negative relation between this instrument and
Parent EPS Forecast, because analysts will be more likely to include an EPS forecast about a
parent company when it operates in a more active industry, represented by smaller values of
Subsidiary IPO / Parent IPO. Analogously, we expect a positive relation between the instrument
and Subsidiary EPS Forecast, as analysts will be more likely to make EPS forecasts about
subsidiaries operating in more active industries, as reflected by higher values of Subsidiary IPO /
Parent IPO. In contrast to these hypothesized relationships, however, there is no direct
mechanism that we are aware of that would systematically link the relative volume of new equity
issues in particular industries to the accuracy of analyst’s EPS forecasts, so our instrument also
satisfies the exclusion restriction.
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Table 8 presents the results of the Heckman regressions. Regression [1] presents the
results of a regression taking Parent EPS Forecast Error as the dependent variable in the
second-stage model and Parent EPS Forecast as the dependent variable in the first-stage model.
In Regression [2], Subsidiary EPS Forecast Error is the dependent variable in the second-stage
model and Subsidiary EPS Forecast is the dependent variable in the first-stage model. In both
regressions, Subsidiary IPO / Parent IPO is the instrument included in the first-stage models.
In both Regressions [1] and [2], the results of the second-stage models remain quite
similar to the results of the ordinary least squares models. Importantly, Subsidiary IPO / Parent
IPO behaves exactly as it was expected to, with a negative and highly significant coefficient in
the first-stage model pertaining to Regression [1] and a positive and significant coefficient in the
first-stage model pertaining to Regression [2]. All in all, the results in this table suggest that our
earlier findings are not attributable to selection.
4.4. Forgotten Children, Neglected Parents?
Thus far, we have established that analysts provide little information in their reports
about subsidiaries which will be spun off from their corporate parents, and this inattention affects
the accuracy of their forecasts in at least two ways: first, analysts make less accurate earnings
forecasts for the subsidiaries than for their parents, and second, the amount and type of analyst
research is much less relevant to earnings forecast accuracy for the subsidiaries than it is for the
parents.
At a first glance, the fact that analysts pay less attention to the subsidiaries than to the
parents themselves can hardly be seen as surprising, since analysts have a mandate to cover the
parents. However, given the size and strategic significance of many of these subsidiaries, a
thorough analysis of the parent’s future performance would seem to require greater attention to
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the subsidiaries about to be spun off. In this subsection, we directly test whether analysts’
abilities to make accurate earnings forecasts about parent companies are hindered by their
inattention to the subsidiaries.
We explore this issue by including the Subsidiary EPS Forecast Error variable as an
independent variable in the Parent EPS Forecast Error regression developed in the previous
subsections. Because analysts only make EPS forecasts for subsidiaries in 263 of the 1,793
reports (as compared to 1,400 reports including parent EPS forecasts), we again use a two-stage
Heckman model to account for the effects of this selection process.
In this specification, the first-stage regression predicts analysts’ propensity to make a
subsidiary EPS forecast and therefore takes Subsidiary EPS Forecast as its dependent variable.
The independent variables in that regression are the same as the variables used in the first-stage
of the subsidiary Heckman model (Regression [2]) in Table 8, including the instrumental
variable, Subsidiary IPO / Parent IPO. The second-stage regression predicts parent earnings
forecast accuracy, and therefore takes Parent EPS Forecast Error as its dependent variable. The
key independent variable in this model is Subsidiary EPS Forecast Error, corrected for selection
due to missing observations by the Heckman estimator. The other independent variables in this
second-stage regression are the same as those included in the second-stage of the parent
Heckman model (Regression [1]) in Table 8.
We present the results of this two-stage model in Table 9. The variables in the first-stage
model behave as they did previously, in particular the instrumental variable, Subsidiary IPO /
Parent IPO, which remains positively and significantly related to Subsidiary EPS Forecast.
More importantly, in the second-stage regression, the coefficient on Subsidiary EPS Forecast
Error is positively and significantly associated with Parent EPS Forecast Error, meaning that
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when analysts make less accurate forecasts about the subsidiaries that will be spun off, they also
make less accurate forecasts about their parents. To rule out the possibility that our results are
due to simple correlation between parent and subsidiary EPS forecast errors, we ran the opposite
regression, including Parent EPS Forecast Error as an independent variable in a regression
taking Subsidiary EPS Forecast Error as its dependent variable; in that model, the coefficient on
Parent EPS Forecast Error is not statistically significant. Thus, our result provides support for
the notion that by forgetting about subsidiaries, analysts also neglect the parents.
4.5. Analyst Research and Price Forecast Accuracy
We conclude this section of the paper by briefly turning our attention to the impact of
analyst research on the accuracy of price forecasts for both parent and subsidiary companies. The
dependent variable is now Price Forecast Error, which we calculate as before. Since higher
values of Price Forecast Error reflect lower accuracy, a negative coefficient for an information
item signifies that such information is associated with more accurate forecasts, and vice versa.
Table 10 presents the results of regressions evaluating price forecast accuracy;
Regression [1] takes Parent Price Forecast Error as its dependent variable and Regression [2]
uses Subsidiary Price Forecast Error as its dependent variable. All of the independent variables
are the same as the ones employed in the previous section of the paper, except for Price
Forecast, which is now excluded. As we did previously, we include year fixed effects, as well as
robust standard errors clustered at the analyst-level to account for intra-group correlation.
In Regression [1], the coefficient on EPS Growth Forecast is negative and significant,
indicating that when analysts include an EPS growth forecast in their reports, they tend to make
more accurate price forecasts. The coefficient on Spinoff Analysis Index is positive and
significant, suggesting that more detailed analyses of spinoff transactions are associated with less
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accurate price forecasts. Finally, the coefficients on Ln(Total Parent Assets) and on Analyst
Ranking by II are both negative and significant, in contrast to our findings in the EPS models.
In Regression [2], the coefficients on Other Subsidiary Forecast and Days from
Announcement to Report Date are both negative and statistically significant, indicating that when
analysts include a profit forecast or have more time to evaluate an upcoming spinoff, they make
more accurate price forecasts for the subsidiary. The coefficient on Subsidiary Financial
Statement Index is positive and significant, meaning that analysts make less accurate price
forecasts the greater the number of subsidiary financial statements they attempt to forecast.
To analyze the sensitivity of our results about price forecast accuracy to the measures and
statistical methods we use, we conduct two additional robustness checks. First, we replace Price
Forecast Error with the measure of price forecast accuracy employed by Asquith et al. (2005),
described in the second row of Panel B in Table 4. Second, just as we did in our analysis of
earnings forecast errors, we employ analyst fixed effects and Heckman models (using Subsidiary
IPO / Parent IPO as the instrument) instead of ordinary least squares regressions. In both cases,
our results are qualitatively unchanged.
Overall, many fewer coefficients are significant in the Price Forecast Error regressions
than were in the EPS Forecast Error models, and once again, this is particularly true in the
subsidiary regression. This finding seems to suggest that the types of projections analysts include
in their reports are less helpful to them in making price forecasts than they are in making EPS
forecasts, especially in the case of the subsidiaries. The result is also consistent with the fact that
stock prices are inherently more difficult to predict than accounting earnings.
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5. Comparing Spinoffs to Other Complex Transactions
Thus far, we have established that analysts provide less information about subsidiaries
that will be spun-off than they do about their parents, and this inattention is associated with less
accurate earnings forecasts for the subsidiaries and in turn, for the parent companies. The
outstanding question is why analysts do not seem to add more value in a context where their
potential to do so seems large. One possible explanation is that spinoffs may be an especially
difficult context for analysts to evaluate.
We investigate this possibility by comparing the earnings forecast errors in our sample
with those reported in studies of other complex situations. As discussed previously (and shown
in Panel A of Table 4), the mean (median) EPS Forecast Error for the parent companies in our
sample is 5.6% (1.3%), and for the subsidiaries, it is 7.5% (3.3%). Rajan and Servaes (1997)
examine analyst EPS forecast errors for IPOs and find that the average errors range from 3.4%
for a three-month window to 5.8% for a 12-month window after the IPO. Clement et al. (2007)
study analyst forecasting performance within the context of firms that experience restructuring
charges from downsizing (e.g., costs of closing plants, selling off assets, or terminating
employees) and report mean earnings forecast errors of 5%. In these cases, the earnings forecast
estimates in the context of our sample of spinoffs appear to be less accurate than those in the
other complex situations, suggesting that the complexity of spinoffs relative to other types of
restructuring may indeed be linked to analysts’ inattention to subsidiaries.
This point is further corroborated by comparing forecast error estimates from studies of
mergers to our sample of spinoffs. On the one hand, in principle, a merger (where one plus one
equals two) is the reverse of a spinoff (where two minus one equals one), suggesting that
analysts should have equal ease or difficulty in making accurate earnings forecast estimates for
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the two types of transactions. On the other hand, because of the intricate links that may have
developed over time across a firm’s different businesses, combined with the challenges of debt
and overhead allocation among the parts of the former whole, spinoffs may turn out to be more
complex to analyze than mergers.
Haw et al. (1994) study the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts around mergers and
find mean (median) absolute forecast errors relative to actual EPS (instead of relative to price) of
19% (10%) in the year before the merger, and 29% (14%) in the year after the merger. However,
the second row in Panel A of Table 4 shows that the mean (median) earnings forecast error
(computed relative to actual EPS rather than to price), is 34.58% (11.30%) for the parent
companies in our sample and 51.25% (44.44%) for the subsidiaries. Clearly, the forecast error
estimates from our sample of spinoffs far exceed the forecast error estimates from Haw et al.’s
sample of mergers, suggesting that spinoffs exhibit a greater degree of complexity than the
reverse type of transaction.
To substantiate our point still further, we also undertake comparisons of the price
forecasts made in our sample of spinoffs to those made in the context of other complex
transactions. To facilitate comparison with the few studies that have analyzed price forecast
accuracy, we report in Panel B of Table 4 price forecast errors measured in two alternative ways.
First, following Gilson et al. (2000), we measure price forecast errors as the natural
logarithm of the ratio of the forecasted stock price to the actual stock price (Line 2 in Panel B of
Table 4), and find mean (median) errors of 42.86% (23.50%) for the parent and 42.17%
(31.60%) for the subsidiary. Gilson et al. (2000) compare the valuation of bankrupt firms that
outside investors or researchers can perform using earnings forecasts published by management
or financial analysts, with the actual market value of those firms. The mean (median) price
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forecast errors they report are -0.5% (9.9%) using a discounted capital cash flow valuation
model, and 3.6% (3.0%) using multiples of comparable companies. 23 Clearly, these figures fall
far short of the estimates from our sample.
Second, following Asquith et al. (2005), we calculate the percentage of analyst reports
whose price forecasts were attained or surpassed by the actual stock price at any time during the
12-month period following the release of the report, and estimate the maximum (minimum)
percentage of the price target attained by the actual stock price during those 12 months, when the
price target was set above (below) the stock price on the report date (Line 3 in Panel B of Table
4). We find that 66% (46%) of the reports that contained parent (subsidiary) price forecasts had
those forecasts attained or surpassed by the actual stock price, which they did by an average of
47% (28%). For the remaining 34% (54%) of reports whose forecasts were never met within 12
months, the actual stock price fell short of attaining the forecast by an average of 20% (27%). In
contrast, 54% of the reports in Asquith et al.’s (2005) sample saw their forecasts attained or
surpassed, by an average of 37%, and in the remaining 46%, the actual price missed the target by
an average of 16%. The larger margin of error we find in our sample is consistent with the fact
that spinoffs are unusually complex situations, whereas the forecasts in Asquith et al. (2005)
were made in the regular course of business for the firms in their sample.
Overall, our examination of analyst forecasting performance and the comparison with
earlier results from a variety of different settings suggests that the challenge analysts face in
forecasting earnings around spinoffs is larger than that encountered in other “special situations”
23

Kaplan and Ruback (1995) perform a similar comparison in the context of highly leveraged transactions and
report similarly measured mean valuation errors that range between 0.3% and -17% depending on the valuation
method used. However, their study relies only on management forecasts as published in legal filings, not on analyst
forecasts, and is therefore less relevant here. Houston et al. (2006) run regressions of IPO actual offer price to sales
ratios on price to sale ratios estimated using the same comparable companies used by analysts to set target prices
when they initiate coverage of the IPO firm and find that the estimated values only explained about 30% of the
variation in IPO offer prices in their sample. However, they do not report valuation errors, thus their results cannot
be directly compared to ours.
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such as IPOs, mergers, bankruptcies, and other forms of corporate restructuring. Forecasting
stock prices for parent and subsidiary companies subsequent to a spinoff seems particularly
difficult, perhaps because spinoffs are the only context in which there is absolutely no price
history for the subsidiaries that need to be analyzed. 24
6. Conclusion
In this paper we investigate equity analysts’ coverage of pending corporate spinoffs, and
analyze whether equity analysts provide investors with useful information about the valuation
consequences of these transactions. Spinoffs provide an interesting context in which to study the
information content of analysts’ research, because the degree of information asymmetry between
corporate insiders and investors is especially high in these situations. Analysts who have
followed these firms for an extended time prior to the completion of these spinoffs should have a
comparative advantage in forecasting the future stand-alone performance of the parent and
subsidiary companies, and in assessing how the spinoffs might impact firms’ market values. At
the same time, however, these restructurings are complex, and they may coincide with significant
changes in firms’ strategies or markets, potentially limiting analysts’ ability to generate useful
information for investors.
We use manually collected data from 1,793 analyst reports that were issued around 62
spinoffs and tracking stock issues to provide detailed empirical evidence about the quantity, type,
and quality of research performed by analysts. We find that analysts pay relatively little attention
in their reports to the subsidiaries that will be spun off (measured, for example, by page counts,
or by whether the reports include explicit forecasts of post-spinoff EPS), even though
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Even in newly public companies, analysts have a minimum price history of 25 days (or 40, since 2002) as a
reference, because of the quiet period that has to be observed after any IPO.

30

subsidiaries generally account for an economically significant share of firms’ operations before
the spinoff––a result we label as “the forgotten child effect.”
Consistent with this lack of attention to subsidiaries, we find that when analysts do
provide forecasts of subsidiary EPS, the forecasts are less accurate than corresponding parent
EPS forecasts. Analysts’ forecasts of post-spinoff stock prices for both parents and subsidiaries
tend to be less accurate than their EPS forecasts. We show that forecasts of parent EPS are more
accurate when analysts or their investment banks have more experience covering the firm or its
industry, and when analysts pay relatively more attention to and provide more detailed
information about the parent in their reports. Similar cross-sectional variation is not observed in
the case of subsidiary EPS forecast errors, however. Moreover, we establish that when analysts
make less accurate forecasts about subsidiaries, they in turn make less accurate forecasts about
their parents, providing evidence that by forgetting about the child in their reports, analysts also
neglect the parent companies.
Finally, we illustrate that both the EPS and price forecast errors in our sample of spinoffs
exceed forecast errors previously documented in the context of other corporate restructuring
transactions, such as IPOs, mergers, and bankruptcies. We conclude that the complexity
associated with forecasting earnings and stock prices in the context of corporate spinoffs,
combined with analysts’ apparent disregard for subsidiaries in their analysis of corporate
spinoffs, seem to limit analysts’ ability to add value as information intermediaries in this setting.
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Table 1. Spinoffs Included in the Sample
List of spinoffs and tracking stock issues included in a random sample of 62 refocusing transactions announced
between 1985 and 2000.
Number
of
Analyst
Reports

Announcement
Date

Effective
Date

4
4
44
184
7
12
104
3
113
25
48

12/2/1992
8/23/1988
7/26/1995
9/20/1995
6/27/1995
4/27/1992
7/12/1999
4/23/1985
9/28/2000
9/9/1997
7/18/2000

12/26/1992
11/30/1988
3/27/1996
12/31/1996
1/4/1996
12/1/1992
3/31/2000
4/10/1986
8/6/2001
3/30/1998
3/30/2001

10

8/26/1996

12/3/1996

5
35
18
25
54
15
54
9
9
17
35
17
34
12
12
2
26
13
11
7

3/29/1988
1/9/1996
1/9/1996
12/16/1999
6/15/1993
6/8/2000
4/14/2000
1/7/1997
1/7/1997
4/25/1985
12/15/1994
4/25/1985
3/4/1999
9/17/1997
10/11/1995
9/15/1993
6/30/1998
8/24/1989
4/17/1990
8/9/1995

10/7/1988
11/1/1996
11/1/1996
10/3/2000
1/4/1994
12/1/2000
6/28/2000
7/23/1997
7/28/1997
11/29/1985
5/10/1995
11/29/1985
6/28/1999
12/16/1997
1/24/1996
12/16/1993
12/31/1998
2/7/1990
10/3/1990
12/26/1995

5

8/27/1992

3/8/1993

12
8
9
17
114
7
26

12/8/1993
6/15/2000
6/19/1986
6/18/1993
3/1/2000
11/7/1986
1/17/1996

3/4/1994
7/13/2000
10/27/1986
3/17/1994
10/2/2000
4/28/1987
5/9/1996

Parent Company Name

Subsidiary Company Name

Adolph Coors
Ametek
Anheuser-Busch
AT&T
Bally Entertainment
Baxter International
Baxter International
Borg-Warner
Bristol-Myers Squibb
Campbell Soup
Ceridian
Consolidated Freightways
(renamed CNF Transportation)
Crane
Dun & Bradstreet
Dun & Bradstreet
Dun & Bradstreet
Eastman Kodak
Fluor (renamed Massey)
Ford Motor
General Instrument
General Instrument
General Mills
General Mills
General Mills
Genzyme
Georgia-Pacific
Halliburton
Harcourt General
Hilton Hotels
Holiday
Honeywell
Host Marriott
Humana (renamed Galen Health
Care )
ITT
Kansas City Southern Industries
Kraft
Litton Industries
Lucent Technologies
Lucky Stores
May Department Stores

ACX Technologies
Ketema
Earthgrains
NCR
Bally's Health & Tennis
Caremark
Edwards Lifesciences
York International
Zimmer Holdings1
Vlasic Foods International
Arbitron
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Consolidated Freightways
Medusa
ACNielsen2
Cognizant2
Moody's Investors Service
Eastman Chemical
Fluor
Visteon
CommScope2
NextLevel Systems2
Crystal Brands2
Darden Restaurants
Kenner Parker Toys2
Genzyme Surgical Products3
Georgia-PacificTimber3
Highlands Insurance Group
GC Cos. (General Cinema)
Park Place Entertainment
Promus
Alliant Techsystems
Host Marriott Services
Humana
Rayonier
Stilwell Financial
Premark International
Western Atlas
Avaya
Hancock Fabrics
Payless ShoeSource

Table 1. Spinoffs Included in the Sample (continued)
Number
of
Analyst
Reports

Announcement
Date

Effective
Date

40

11/14/1995

7/1/1996

21

2/27/1989

7/3/1989

4
18
2
99
16
31
56
14
28
28
14
67
28
12
12
27
15
6
11
12
78

9/5/1996
3/9/1999
9/23/1998
1/23/1997
11/1/1995
1/30/1995
4/24/1990
8/16/1993
6/29/1998
3/17/1997
4/29/1999
9/24/1996
12/16/1991
1/16/1998
1/16/1998
7/21/1999
6/23/1997
9/18/1987
6/23/1997
9/28/1990
11/1/2000

12/31/1996
6/15/1999
4/27/1999
10/7/1997
5/31/1996
7/3/1995
7/16/1991
3/31/1994
12/31/1998
10/2/1997
11/4/1999
12/10/1997
7/6/1992
6/10/1998
6/10/1998
3/23/2000
1/30/1998
1/1/1989
1/30/1998
4/2/1991
6/7/2001

Parent Company Name

Minnesota Mining &
Manufacturing (3M)
Morton-Thiokol (renamed
Thiokol)
Murphy Oil
Nabisco Group Holdings
PE Biosystems
PepsiCo
Premark International
Promus
Quaker Oats
Ralston Purina
Rockwell International
Rockwell International
Tenneco
Thermo Electron
Union Carbide
US Office Products
US Office Products
Weatherford International
Whitman
Whitman
Whitman
Whitman
WorldCom

1

Subsidiary Company Name

Imation
Morton International
Deltic Timber
RJ Reynolds Tobacco Holdings
Celera Genomics3
Tricon Global Restaurants
Tupperware
Promus Hotel
Fisher-Price
Ralcorp Holdings
Conexant Systems
Meritor Automotive
Packaging Corp. of America
Thermo Vision
Praxair
Aztec Technology Partners2
School Specialty2
Grant Prideco
Hussmann International2
Illinois Central Transportation
Midas2
Pet
MCI Group3

Bristol-Myers Squibb announced its planned divestiture of Zimmer on September 28, 2000. On February 22, 2001,
it announced that the divestiture would be structured as a tax-free spin-off to shareholders.
2
Part of a multiple divestiture
3
Tracking stock issue
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Table 2. Financial Characteristics of Spinoff Parent and Subsidiary Firms, 1985-2001
The sample is a random sample of 62 refocusing transactions (spinoffs and tracking stock issues) announced
between 1985 and 2000. All variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year in which each spinoff became
effective.
Means

Medians

Parent

Subsidiary

t-stat.

Parent

Subsidiary

Chi2(1)

Sales ($000)

9,281.6

2,202.4

2.40**

3,692.0

1,189.3

6.34***

Assets ($000)

12,519.8

1,989.4

2.14**

3,461.6

1,036.1

5.98***

Debt/Assets

0.299

0.302

-0.07

0.270

0.246

0.67

EBIT/Sales

0.124

0.008

1.30

0.114

0.081

1.89*

CAPEX/Sales

0.074

0.188

-0.92

0.055

0.047

0.91

11,765.5

1,674.6

3.44***

3,474.6

1,049.3

5.31***

2.035

2.196

-0.51

1.858

1.587

1.53

52

62

n/a

52

62

n/a

Market Value ($000)
Tobin’s q
Number of Unique Companies
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Table 3. Information Content of Analyst Reports about Upcoming Spinoffs
Percentage of reports that provide information about the parent or subsidiary in a spinoff, or about the transaction
itself. The sample consists of 1,793 analyst reports covering the parent company and/or the subsidiary from a
random sample of 62 refocusing transactions (58 spinoffs and 4 tracking stock issues) announced between 1985 and
2000.
Panel A. Company-Specific Information
Parent-Only
Information

Subsidiary-Only
Information

Price Targets
Stock Price
Market Value

32.7%
4.1%

38.4%
7.0%

EPS Forecasts
Parent- or Subsidiary-Only EPS Forecasts
Consolidated EPS Forecasts
Both Parent-Only EPS and Consolidated EPS Forecasts
No EPS Forecasts
EPS Growth

26.3%
53.3%
0.9%
19.5%
45.6%

19.5%
n/a
n/a
80.5%
2.7%

PE Forecasts

77.2%

7.8%

Other Profit Forecasts *
CF or CF/Share
Revenue
EBITDA or EBITDA/Share
EBIT or EBT
Net Income
ROE
TEV/EBITDA
Total Other Profit Forecasts

9.1%
2.1%
4.0%
1.5%
3.0%
5.5%
1.8%
33.0%

0.8%
0.8%
3.2%
1.3%
0.6%
0.4%
0.3%
8.8%

Financial Statements Forecasts
Income Statement
Balance Sheet
Cash Flow Statement

21.4%
6.4%
7.2%

7.6%
2.3%
2.5%

Valuation Methods **
PE Multiple
Other Multiple
DCF

32.1%
7.7%
1.4%

10.8%
8.0%
1.2%

3.3
0.6

0.9
0.1

Avge. Number of Pages Discussing Company or Industry
Avge. Fraction of Total Pages in Report Discussing Company or Industry
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Table 3. Information Content of Analyst Reports about Upcoming Spinoffs (continued)
Panel B. Spinoff-Specific Information
Percentage of Reports that Discuss or Provide Analysis of:
Parent or Subsidiary's Competitors
Rationale for Spinoff
Transaction Costs of Spinoff
Conglomerate Discount
Allocation of Debt or Overhead
Business Segment Financial Information

32.9%
26.4%
8.4%
13.3%
13.8%
35.4%

Stock Recommendation
Buy/Positive
Sell/Negative
Hold/Neutral
None

62.0%
0.8%
24.7%
12.5%

Opinion about Spinoff
Positive
Negative
Neutral/Mixed
None

34.7%
1.0%
48.7%
15.6%

Number of Reports
Average Number of Reports per Spinoff
Average Number of Reports per Deal

1,793
28.9
8.5
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Table 4. Earnings and Price Forecast Accuracy around Spinoffs
Errors in analyst forecasts of earnings-per-share and stock price. Forecast errors are measured in several alternative
ways, as indicated in the table. When EPS Forecast Error is measured as the absolute difference between forecasted
EPS and actual EPS on the forecast date, scaled by the company’s stock price, the parent’s stock price is measured
at the end of the fiscal year prior to the forecast period, while the subsidiary’s stock price is measured at the end of
the first fiscal year in which the stock trades. For Price Forecast Error, stock price is always measured as of the
forecast date unless otherwise specified. The sample consists of 1,793 analyst reports covering the parent company
and/or the subsidiary from a random sample of 62 refocusing transactions (58 spinoffs and 4 tracking stock issues)
announced between 1985 and 2000.
Parent
Forecast Errors

Subsidiary
Forecast Errors

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

1. Absolute Error Relative to Actual Price: | EF – EA | / PA

5.60%

1.30%

7.50%

3.30%

2. Absolute Error Relative to Actual EPS: | EF – EA | / EA

34.58%

11.30%

51.25%

44.44%

Panel A. EPS Forecast Errors

Number of Reports Containing EPS Forecasts

263

1,400

Panel B. Price Forecast Errors
1. Absolute Error Relative to Actual Price: | PF – PA | / PA

44.10%

21.10%

47.90%

26.40%

2. Log of Ratio of Target to Actual Price: Ln (PF / PA)

42.86%

23.50%

42.17%

31.60%

% of Reports where PA ≥ PF within 12 Months

65.93%

n/a

46.08%

n/a

12-Month Maximum PA Relative to Target Price PF

146.68%

128.16%

127.72%

116.58%

% of Reports where PA ≤ PF within 12 Months

34.07%

n/a

53.92%

n/a

12-Month Minimum PA Relative to Target Price PF

120.29%

112.16%

126.87%

119.05%

3. a) If Target Price PF > Actual Price PA on Report Date:

b) If Target Price PF < Actual Price PA on Report Date:

Number of Reports Containing Price Forecasts

587

40

683

Table 5. Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for key variables. The sample consists of 1,793 analyst reports covering the parent company
and/or the subsidiary from a random sample of 62 refocusing transactions (58 spinoffs and 4 tracking stock issues)
announced between 1985 and 2000.
Parent-Level
Variables
Mean
S.D.

Subsidiary-Level
Variables
Mean
S.D.

Parent or Subsidiary Share of Report Pages

0.607

0.384

0.149

0.246

Total Report Pages

5.666

7.375

5.666

7.375

Number of Annual Parent or Subsidiary EPS Forecasts

1.632

0.907

0.345

0.772

Parent or Subsidiary Price Forecast

0.327

0.469

0.384

0.486

Parent or Subsidiary EPS Growth Forecast

0.456

0.498

0.027

0.161

Parent or Subsidiary PE Forecast

0.772

0.419

0.078

0.268

Parent or Subsidiary Other Forecast

0.330

0.470

0.088

0.283

Parent or Subsidiary Financial Statement Index

0.349

0.729

0.124

0.449

Spinoff Analysis Index

1.247

1.313

1.247

1.313

Days from Announcement to Report Date

117.853

102.133

117.853

102.133

Ln(Total Assets of Parent or Subsidiary)

9.283

1.315

7.375

1.613

Total Assets of Subsidiary / Total Assets of Parent

0.455

1.185

0.455

1.185

Relatedness

0.090

0.287

0.090

0.287

Analyst Ranking by II

0.934

1.428

0.934

1.428

Broker Reputation Ranking

3.689

6.941

3.689

6.941

Analyst Provides 10%+ of Broker’s Reports in Sector

0.807

0.395

0.807

0.395

Broker Provides 2%+ of Reports in Sector

0.489

0.500

0.489

0.500

Analyst Advisor

0.173

0.733

0.173

0.733

Optimistic Spinoff Spin

0.347

0.476

0.347

0.476

Pessimistic Spinoff Spin

0.010

0.100

0.010

0.100
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Table 6. Information Content of Analyst Reports and Earnings Forecast Accuracy:
Ordinary Least Squares
Ordinary Least Squares regressions of earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast errors on various items of information
contained in analyst reports. EPS Forecast Error is measured as the absolute difference between forecasted EPS and
actual EPS on the forecast date, scaled by the company’s stock price: | EF – EA | / PA. For the parent forecast error,
stock price is measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the forecast period. For the subsidiary forecast error,
stock price is measured at the end of the first fiscal year in which the stock trades. The sample consists of 1,793
analyst reports covering the parent company and/or the subsidiary from a random sample of 62 refocusing
transactions (58 spinoffs and 4 tracking stock issues) announced between 1985 and 2000. Robust standard errors
clustered at the analyst-level are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or
10% (*) level, respectively.
Parent EPS
Forecast Errors [1]
Coef.
S.E.
Parent or Subsidiary Share of Report Pages
Total Report Pages
Parent or Subsidiary Price Forecast
Number of Annual Parent or Subsidiary EPS Forecasts
Parent or Subsidiary EPS Growth Forecast
Parent or Subsidiary PE Forecast
Parent or Subsidiary Other Forecast
Parent or Subsidiary Financial Statement Index
Spinoff Analysis Index
Days from Announcement to Report Date
Ln(Total Assets of Parent or Subsidiary)
Total Assets of Subsidiary / Total Assets of Parent
Relatedness
Analyst Ranking by II
Broker Reputation Ranking
Analyst Provides 10%+ of Broker’s Reports in Sector
Broker Provides 2%+ of Reports in Sector
Analyst Advisor
Optimistic Spinoff Spin
Pessimistic Spinoff Spin
Constant

-0.060**
0.001
0.004
-0.032***
-0.021
0.012
-0.024**
0.019***
-0.007
-0.000*
0.011***
0.037***
-0.068***
0.011*
0.002*
-0.022*
-0.043***
-0.016*
-0.023*
0.087
0.038

Observations
R-squared

1,400
0.220
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0.023
0.001
0.008
0.010
0.014
0.015
0.011
0.007
0.004
0.000
0.004
0.006
0.023
0.006
0.001
0.011
0.014
0.008
0.012
0.074
0.040

Subsidiary EPS
Forecast Errors [2]
Coef.
S.E.
0.032
0.000
-0.037**
0.010
0.034
0.007
-0.014
0.017
0.003
-0.000*
0.024*
0.000
-0.101
0.001
-0.001
-0.015
0.037*
-0.024**
-0.019
0.137
-0.057
263
0.551

0.024
0.001
0.017
0.011
0.042
0.020
0.020
0.012
0.006
0.000
0.014
0.020
0.064
0.007
0.002
0.032
0.021
0.011
0.012
0.124
0.102

Table 7. Information Content of Analyst Reports and Earnings Forecast Accuracy:
Analyst Fixed Effects
Analyst fixed effects regressions of earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast errors on various items of information
contained in analyst reports. EPS Forecast Error is measured as the absolute difference between forecasted EPS and
actual EPS on the forecast date, scaled by the company’s stock price: | EF – EA | / PA. For the parent forecast error,
stock price is measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the forecast period. For the subsidiary forecast error,
stock price is measured at the end of the first fiscal year in which the stock trades. The sample consists of 1,793
analyst reports covering the parent company and/or the subsidiary from a random sample of 62 refocusing
transactions (58 spinoffs and 4 tracking stock issues) announced between 1985 and 2000. Robust standard errors
clustered at the analyst-level are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or
10% (*) level, respectively.
Parent EPS
Forecast Errors [1]
Coef.
S.E.
Parent or Subsidiary Share of Report Pages
Total Report Pages
Parent or Subsidiary Price Forecast
Number of Annual Parent or Subsidiary EPS Forecasts
Parent or Subsidiary EPS Growth Forecast
Parent or Subsidiary PE Forecast
Parent or Subsidiary Other Forecast
Parent or Subsidiary Financial Statement Index
Spinoff Analysis Index
Days from Announcement to Report Date
Ln(Total Assets of Parent or Subsidiary)
Total Assets of Subsidiary / Total Assets of Parent
Relatedness
Analyst Ranking by II
Broker Reputation Ranking
Analyst Provides 10%+ of Broker’s Reports in Sector
Broker Provides 2%+ of Reports in Sector
Analyst Advisor
Optimistic Spinoff Spin
Pessimistic Spinoff Spin
Constant

-0.018*
0.000
0.000
-0.020**
0.001
0.015
0.006
0.000
0.001
0.000**
-0.044*
0.032**
-0.126**
-0.016
-0.001
-0.034
-0.055
-0.105*
-0.003
-0.030
0.510**

Observations
R-squared

1,400
0.364
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0.010
0.000
0.005
0.008
0.012
0.011
0.007
0.006
0.003
0.000
0.024
0.016
0.061
0.013
0.002
0.029
0.041
0.058
0.006
0.021
0.236

Subsidiary EPS
Forecast Errors [2]
Coef.
S.E.
0.014
-0.001
0.046
-0.011
0.054
-0.008
0.030
0.016
-0.014
0.000
0.041
-0.022
0.000
-0.012
0.000
-0.041
-0.009
0.084
0.012
-0.038
-0.185
263
0.172

0.018
0.001
0.029
0.009
0.035
0.020
0.021
0.014
0.012
0.000
0.059
0.184
0.000
0.029
0.003
0.066
0.115
0.116
0.016
0.028
0.324

Table 8. Information Content of Analyst Reports and Earnings Forecast Accuracy:
Heckman Two-Stage Models
Heckman two-stage regressions of earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast errors on various items of information
contained in analyst reports. The dependent variable in the first stage is the probability that the analyst report
contains EPS Forecasts for the parent or subsidiary company (depending on the regression). The dependent variable
in the second stage is EPS Forecast Error, measured as the absolute difference between forecasted EPS and actual
EPS on the forecast date, scaled by the company’s stock price: | EF – EA | / PA. For the parent forecast error, stock
price is measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the forecast period. For the subsidiary forecast error, stock
price is measured at the end of the first fiscal year in which the stock trades. The sample consists of 1,793 analyst
reports covering the parent company and/or the subsidiary from a random sample of 62 refocusing transactions (58
spinoffs and 4 tracking stock issues) announced between 1985 and 2000. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively.
Parent EPS
Forecast Error [1]
Stage 1
Stage 2
Pr[Forecast]

Error

Subsidiary EPS
Forecast Error [2]
Stage 1
Stage 2
Pr[Forecast]

Error

Subsidiary IPO / Parent IPO

-0.034***

0.030***

Parent or Subsidiary Share of Report Pages

0.606***

-0.059***

0.159

0.034

0.010

Total Report Pages

0.011

0.190

0.013

0.249

0.024

-0.006

0.001

0.001

0.000

0.008

0.001

0.007

0.001

Parent or Subsidiary Price Forecast

0.426***

0.005

0.632***

-0.020

0.144

0.009

0.139

0.022

No. of Annual Parent or Subsidiary EPS Forecasts

1.390***

-0.029***

1.268***

0.029*

0.100

0.009

0.085

0.017

-0.081

-0.021**

-0.044

0.034

0.147

0.008

0.281

0.024

1.230***

0.017

0.336*

0.013

0.164

0.017

0.181

0.018

0.025

-0.025***

0.282

-0.011

0.145

0.009

0.180

0.017

-0.134

0.019***

-0.039

0.017*

0.092

0.006

0.113

0.010

0.037

-0.006*

0.095*

0.004

0.058

0.004

0.054

0.006

0.001

-0.000*

0.000

-0.000*

0.001

0.000

0.001

0.000

-0.070

0.012***

0.002

0.021***

0.055

0.004

0.055

0.007

-0.380***

0.036***

0.091

0.007

Parent or Subsidiary EPS Growth Forecast
Parent or Subsidiary PE Forecast
Parent or Subsidiary Other Forecast
Parent or Subsidiary Financial Statement Index
Spinoff Analysis Index
Days from Announcement to Report Date
Ln(Total Assets of Parent or Subsidiary)
Total Assets of Subsidiary / Total Assets of Parent

0.065

0.005

0.091

0.013

Relatedness

-0.409

-0.068***

0.107

-0.103***

0.273

0.019

0.317

0.037

Analyst Ranking by II

0.031

0.011***

-0.035

0.001

Broker Reputation Ranking

0.041

0.003

0.045

0.005

0.041***

0.002***

0.028***

-0.001
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Analyst Provides 10%+ of Broker’s Reports in Sector
Broker Provides 2%+ of Reports in Sector
Analyst Advisor
Optimistic Spinoff Spin
Pessimistic Spinoff Spin
Constant

0.008

0.001

0.010

0.001

0.280*

-0.021*

-0.330*

-0.023

0.169

0.011

0.170

0.021

-0.046

-0.044***

-0.110

0.033*

0.142

0.009

0.142

0.018

0.058

-0.015**

0.031

-0.024**

0.083

0.006

0.108

0.012

0.046

-0.023**

-0.170

-0.020

0.139

0.009

0.142

0.015

5.306

0.089**

0.171

0.142**

0.000

0.035

0.570

0.064

-1.333

0.023

-2.302***

-0.117

0.952

0.050

0.534

0.083

Lambda

0.019

0.044

0.028
Observations

1,793
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1,400

0.032
1,793

263

Table 9. Impact of Subsidiary Forecast Accuracy on Parent Forecast Accuracy
Heckman two-stage regressions of earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast errors on various items of information
contained in analyst reports. The dependent variable in the first stage is the probability that the analyst report
contains EPS Forecasts for the subsidiary company. The dependent variable in the second stage is Parent EPS
Forecast Error, measured as the absolute difference between forecasted EPS and actual EPS on the forecast date,
scaled by the company’s stock price: | EF – EA | / PA. Stock price is measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the
forecast period. The sample consists of 1,793 analyst reports covering the parent company and/or the subsidiary
from a random sample of 62 refocusing transactions (58 spinoffs and 4 tracking stock issues) announced between
1985 and 2000. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***),
5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively.
Parent EPS Forecast Error

Subsidiary IPO / Parent IPO

Stage 1

Stage 2

Pr[ Subsidiary Forecast]

Parent Forecast Error

0.029**
0.013

Subsidiary EPS Forecast Error

0.156**
0.070

Parent or Subsidiary Share of Report Pages

-0.417

-0.093***

0.276

0.033

Total Report Pages

0.009

-0.001

0.007

0.001

Parent or Subsidiary Price Forecast

0.750***

0.003

0.151

0.020

No. of Annual Parent or Subsidiary EPS Forecasts

1.293***

-0.004

Parent or Subsidiary EPS Growth Forecast
Parent or Subsidiary PE Forecast
Parent or Subsidiary Other Forecast
Parent or Subsidiary Financial Statement Index
Spinoff Analysis Index
Days from Announcement to Report Date
Ln(Total Assets of Parent or Subsidiary)
Total Assets of Subsidiary / Total Assets of Parent
Relatedness
Analyst Ranking by II
Broker Reputation Ranking
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0.091

0.012

-0.189

-0.006

0.346

0.017

0.066

0.011

0.205

0.028

0.371*

-0.003

0.200

0.018

-0.220*

0.017*

0.134

0.010

0.141**

-0.010

0.058

0.008

-0.001

-0.000*

0.001

0.000

0.042

-0.012

0.068

0.010

0.015

0.047***

0.105

0.014

0.318

-0.127***

0.341

0.047

-0.024

0.006

0.048

0.006

0.028***

0.001***

0.011

0.001

Analyst Provides 10%+ of Broker’s Reports in Sector

-0.394**

Broker Provides 2%+ of Reports in Sector
Analyst Advisor
Optimistic Spinoff Spin
Pessimistic Spinoff Spin
Constant

0.003

0.177

0.024

-0.061

-0.065

0.152

0.021

0.032

0.011

0.121

0.018

-0.280*

-0.038**

0.156

0.019

0.422

-0.045

0.549

0.063

-2.623***

0.164

0.613
Lambda

0.113
-0.007
0.020

Observations

1,714
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Table 10. Information Content of Analyst Reports and Price Forecast Accuracy
Ordinary Least Squares regressions of price forecast errors on various items of information contained in analyst
reports. Price Forecast Error is measured as the absolute difference between forecasted (target) stock price and
actual stock price on the forecast date, scaled by the company’s stock price on the same date: | PF – PA | / PA. The
sample consists of 1,793 analyst reports covering the parent company and/or the subsidiary from a random sample
of 62 refocusing transactions (58 spinoffs and 4 tracking stock issues) announced between 1985 and 2000. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*)
level, respectively.
Parent Price Forecast
Errors [1]
Coef.
S.E.
Parent or Subsidiary Share of Report Pages
Total Report Pages
Number of Annual Parent or Subsidiary EPS Forecasts
Parent or Subsidiary EPS Growth Forecast
Parent or Subsidiary PE Forecast
Parent or Subsidiary Other Forecast
Parent or Subsidiary Financial Statement Index
Spinoff Analysis Index
Days from Announcement to Report Date
Ln(Total Assets of Parent or Subsidiary)
Total Assets of Subsidiary / Total Assets of Parent
Relatedness
Analyst Ranking by II
Broker Reputation Ranking
Analyst Provides 10%+ of Broker’s Reports in Sector
Broker Provides 2%+ of Reports in Sector
Analyst Advisor
Optimistic Spinoff Spin
Pessimistic Spinoff Spin
Constant

0.061
0.000
0.008
-0.112**
-0.291
0.067
-0.087
0.055**
0.000
-0.109**
-0.033
0.089
-0.051**
0.005
0.125
-0.095
-0.050
0.001
-0.282
1.220***

Observations
R-squared

587
0.203

48

0.104
0.007
0.051
0.051
0.180
0.069
0.084
0.028
0.000
0.044
0.069
0.392
0.023
0.004
0.085
0.076
0.046
0.072
0.182
0.350

Subsidiary Price
Forecast Errors [2]
Coef.
S.E.
0.079
0.000
0.012
-0.050
-0.054
-0.479***
0.111*
-0.036
-0.001**
0.023
0.049
-0.118
0.019
0.007
0.009
-0.007
-0.059
-0.024
0.557
0.296
683
0.333

0.112
0.003
0.047
0.101
0.089
0.132
0.066
0.031
0.000
0.025
0.055
0.132
0.025
0.005
0.099
0.073
0.057
0.070
0.677
0.200

